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Effectiveness of the Administrative Accountability System in Light of Law and Economics Analysis: A Two-Tier Deterrence Model in Public Law of Iran and the United Kingdom
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Hadi Shokri   , Mahdi Falahkhariki , Ahmad Esfandyari |
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Abstract: (37 Views) |
Administrative omission represents one of the most complex manifestations of institutional inefficiency within Iran’s public law system. This phenomenon is not merely the result of individual negligence by officials but reflects structural weaknesses in incentive design and accountability mechanisms in public administration. This study employs a law and economics approach, combined with descriptive-analytical methods, to propose an effective model for preventing and deterring administrative omissions in Iran.
Findings indicate that in advanced legal systems, particularly in the United Kingdom as a key example of common law, administrative liability for omissions is based on two core criteria: the legal duty to act and the foreseeability of harm. Economic analysis further demonstrates that governmental legal responsibility for omissions should be a function of cost–benefit equilibrium and the efficiency of incentive mechanisms, ensuring both the prevention of social harm and the avoidance of disproportionate costs to public institutions.
An examination of Iran’s administrative law framework reveals that its reactive nature, ambiguity in the standard of fault, and lack of clear performance indicators reduce deterrence and weaken officials’ motivation to act effectively. In response, this study proposes a two-tier administrative accountability model, wherein the first tier emphasizes legal and civil responsibilities, and the second tier focuses on economic and incentive-based mechanisms. Transitioning from a purely punitive approach to an incentive–deterrence system is essential for achieving institutional efficiency and public trust in Iran’s administrative system. Within this model, government officials are encouraged toward proactive, transparent, and anticipatory behavior through a combination of limited financial liability, performance-based rewards, and smart supervisory mechanisms.
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| Keywords: Administrative omission, Law and economics, Administrative accountability, Institutional efficiency, Deterrence, Public law in Iran. |
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Type of Study: Research |
Subject:
Special
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